Research funding (II)

[Alexander Berezin]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sat, 27 Jan 1996 12:25:37 -0500 (EST)
From: Alexander Berezin <berezin at mcmail.CIS.McMaster.CA>
To: Ashok Grover <groverak at fhs.csu.McMaster.CA>


On Sat, 27 Jan 1996, Ashok Grover wrote:

> Dear Dave:
>    If you are for real and if you have kept any record of these 
> proceedings, get a lawyer.
> 
>    If you are a figment of Alex's imagination,  shame on Alex.
> akg

Dear Dave:

Because you are not a figment of my imagination, you
can safely ignore the second sentence above.

As for the first sentence, Dr. Grover may not well
realize that lawyers cost money and there are absolutely 
no guarantees that you ever recover MANY thousands of 
dollars you are bound to spend on ANY legal move, even 
minor one.

I am afraid, therefore, that the advise 'get a lawyer'
without knowing well the financial circumstances of
a person (and I doubt Dr. Grover can know much about
the financial situation of 'figments of imagination')
is simply an empty statement, without much responsibility
in it.

If you want to make a difference, get out of the
closet and join your colleagues in CARRF (Canadian 
Association for Responsible Researach Funding) to
fight the unfair and secretive 'selectivity' system
of research funding.

Alex Berezin


> 
> 
> 	
> 
> > > Fellow researchers,
> > > I would appreciate some feedback on this post by email if possible. 
> > > As a research associate (research assistant professor) who is expected 
> > > to write or make major contributions to my employers operating grants, 
> > > I recently found an industrial/academic granting program which was open 
> > > worldwide to all investigators (both principle investigators and 
> > > postdoctoral fellows). I duly sent in a preproposal and was invited to 
> > > submit a full proposal. I asked my department chair whether I was 
> > > permitted to apply for such funding independently of my employer and 
> > > was told that I was eligible as my position was considered to
> > > be at least semi-independent and so proceeded with the application. 
> > > I was eager to branch out on my own as I had already made major 
> > > contributions together with another colleague to operating grants in my 
> > > employers name on at least two occasions in the last year. Also, such 
> > > grant applications are a good addition to ones CV , as one cannot 
> > > really state that it was actually oneself who wrote MRC
> > > or NSERC grant ####### (the system would find that a little to
> > > difficult to swallow, I think). Anyway, I obtained the chairs signature 
> > > on this document only to be told by the deans representative that I was 
> > > not eligible to apply for such funding. The reason given to me was a 
> > > technicality. Apparently the university where I am employed has legally 
> > > binding contracts with its tenured faculty making them responsible for 
> > > any over expenditure and that such contracts did not
> > > extend to people such as myself. Thus, at the 11th hour, I was 
> > > forced into making a decision about whether I should shred the grant 
> > > there and then, or once again get my employer to co-sign the 
> > > application. I was reluctant to do this,
> > > but agreed to it as the purpose of the grant was as much to obtain
> > > money for the
> > > lab in these difficult times (something I frequently hear tenured faculty
> > > whining about over coffee) as it was to be a little more independent. In my
> > > despare I asked a well known colleague at one of the top US ivy-league
> > > universites if this was common practice and was promptly told that this was
> > > clearly a politically motivated hurdle and that it was absurd to 
> > > prevent people
> > > such as myself, with my own independent reputation (so I am told) 
> > > from applying
> > > for such things (so much for entrepreneurship in Canadian science). 
> > > My question is this. Is this a common practice in all Canadian 
> > > Universities? If it is, why is this so? Clearly the European and US 
> > > universities are taking a much broader view in these financially 
> > > strapped times realising that it is often impossible
> > > for faculty members to employ people such as myself on one or two small to
> > > medium sized operating grants. I realise I don't yet belong to this 
> > > elite club,
> > > but surely tenured academics are not that insecure that they need 
> > > to desperately
> > > manipulate the system to undermine the careers of their juniors. 
> > > Or are they?
> > > You tell me. Email to Dave at the above address. Thanks in advance.
> > > 
> > 
> > Dear Dave:
> > 
> > The operating manual of NSERC funding system in Canada is to 
> > provide generous (usually excessive) funding to the members of 
> > the inner club (you-fund-me-I-fund-you principle), give some
> > peanuts to (randomly selected) few [ to dilute the dissent ]
> > and to cut as many as possible to zero funding. And you are
> > right: most people don't object the system: they are either
> > happy (funded) or too intimidated to voice the protest. 
> > 
> > Below are 2 of our eariler papers giving some more details 
> > on the 'philosophy' and practice of this system.
> > 
> > Best wishes - Alex Berezin   
> > 
> > ------------------------------------------------------
> > MYTH OF COMPETITION AND NSERC POLICY OF "SELECTIVITY"
> > Alexander A. Berezin  and  Geoffrey Hunter
> > (published in "Canadian Chemical News", March, 1994) 
> > 
> >    A widely held misconception about science it that its
> > quality can greatly benefit from the so called "competition
> > for excellence" which is externally "coordinated" by funding
> > agencies. Scientific and engineering research in canadian
> > universities is supported almost exclusively through the Natural 
> > Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC). The basis for
> > the present NSERC funding philosophy and practice is the idea of
> > "selectivity", i.e. the policy of NOT funding all the applicants.
> > This is done in the name of the alleged "excellence" of research
> > and its "competitiveness". 
> > 
> >    This is reflected both in the adopted NSERC terminology (terms
> > like "grant SELECTION committee", "next COMPETITION") and the
> > explicit instructions (!) to committees to recommend a
> > significant fraction of applicants for non-awards ("NIL" awards).
> > Notwithstanding the best intentions of its designers, the present
> > NSERC funding system leads to a highly detrimental
> > effect: instead of being IDEA AND OPPORTUNITY DRIVEN which is the
> > true path to excellence (1), the research is GRANT DRIVEN,
> > GRANT LIMITED and GRANT SEEKING. The only real concern of any
> > applicant to NSERC is how to optimize all his/her research along
> > a single (!) criterium : fundability.
> > 
> >    The net result of this system is that truly innovative
> > research is often suppressed by the censorship of the peer-review
> > process (2). The present NSERC policies encourage prolific
> > productivity of routine (but easily publishable) results along
> > well established mainstream research directions. Peer-reviewers
> > are invariably drawn from the scientific establishement. They
> > will be supportive of the established (their) projects rather
> > than truly innovative projects; innovative projects are by
> > definition not established (3). How supportive was the scientific
> > establishment when Boltzmann presented statistical mechanics ? 
> >                     
> >    Stressing the very idea of "competition" is based on the
> > illegitimate transfer of a business model to science. This is a
> > case when a model is used beyond its actual range of validity.
> > The so called "competition for excellence" has long ago passed
> > all reasonable limits needed for a healthy stimulation and 
> > turned into a ferocious rat-race and Darwinian fight for survival
> > based on a principle of confirmity to the mainstream. Often
> > really innovative research can only be maintained by its careful
> > concealment behind the mainstream facade. This dilemma is
> > especially acute for many interdisciplinary studies and for the 
> > research which challenges the accepted paradigmas and the
> > established dogmas.
> > 
> >    While it is undeniable that many NSERC-supported projects are
> > of a very high calibre, they became so largely IN SPITE of the
> > system rather than because of it. Their continuing support does
> > not offset the highly damaging implications of "NIL-awards" for
> > the morale and research ethics of the entire university
> > community. Also, a NIL-award to a researcher has a devastating
> > effect on his/her graduate students, many of whom will consider
> > dropping a research career altogether. This means a potential
> > loss of the most valuable of all resources - a human talent.
> > 
> >    In terms of canadian research output and international
> > competitiveness, NIL awards to active researchers leave a
> > significant fraction of highly (and often uniquely !) trained
> > scientists FUNCTIONALLY UNEMPLOYED (even though they are paid
> > salaries TO DO RESEARCH !). Our (very concervative) estimate is
> > that at least a thousand (!) full-time faculty members in science
> > and engineering departments in canadian universities have no
> > external funding whatsoever. On the other hand, a significant
> > number of well established mainstream research groups
> > ("departmental empires"), often with little real innovation, are
> > clearly OVERfunded. Furthermore, the overselling the notion
> > of research "underfunding" is in the interest of such
> > super-groups experienced in the game of Grantsmenship.
> > 
> >    It is a very common stand for almost any group, including the
> > research community, to attribute all their problems to the
> > underfunding. "Just give us more money and everything will be
> > OK". It is always easier to blame somebody else than to look
> > inside your own household - this is the reason why the
> > underfunding mythology is so universally attractive and popular.
> > However, despite that Canada indeed falls behind some other
> > developed contries in terms of its total R & D expenedure, the
> > crux of the problem is NOT so much in the bulk underfunding as in
> > the MISMANAGEMENT of the available resources. Contrary to what
> > may seem obvouis, under the present funding system "more money"
> > from the government (even if lobbing for extra funding will
> > succeed !) will EXACERBATE rather than solve the problem, as
> > almost all gains of new public money will go to the already well
> > funded groups and NOT to NIL-funded researchers. This is a well
> > known "Matthew effect" in science "give-to-those-who- have-and-
> > take-from-those-who-haven't") (4). 
> > 
> >    We believe that the real roots of major flaws of present NSERC
> > system lie in its UNDEMOCRATIC nature. Presently the membership
> > renewal in committees is NOT discussed publicly and no electorial
> > process is in place. Instead, we have an oligarchic system in
> > which "committees are simply designated by previuos committees".
> > Apart from some scattered letters in the public press from
> > individual researchers, there is no sound democratic feedback
> > mechanism to NSERC from the entire university research community.
> > 
> >    The ineviatble result of any oligarchic structure is that it
> > proliferates for its own sake. In NSERC case the consequences are
> > the overblown and overcomplicated (and resource-draining) funding
> > structure of many dozens of discipline and program committees. To
> > justify their very existence the multiple NSERC committees
> > require unnecessary lengthly proposals and multistaged process 
> > of "proposals evaluations". The latter process is de facto
> > largely consists of a second peer-review of already peer-reviewed
> > (!) published papers.
> > 
> >    Present NSERC trend to even more tighter peer-review "quality
> > control", even greater "selectivity" in funding (more NIL-awards)
> > is a step in a precisely THE OPPOSITE direction to what is
> > required to forster the real excellence and innovation.
> > Paradoxically it may sound, but agencies like NSERC need LESS (!)
> > (and not more !) expertise to improve their operations. The
> > bottomline performance of a complex decision-making system (like
> > NSERC) is NOT a linear function of the overall "expertise" it
> > has. In fact, it is an inverted U-curve with a maximum (optimum)
> > beyond which the system LOOSES its efficiency. This is a known
> > effect of an over-controlled system - too many strings damage the
> > adaptability. Like with vitamines, the overdose turns stimulation
> > into a poison. In our opinion NSERC presently suffers from a
> > severe "OVERexpertisation".
> > 
> >    To alleviate the damaging aspects of present NSERC functioning
> > for the canadian university system, canadian economic
> > competitiveness and better management of financial and human
> > resources WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING REFORMS:
> > 
> > 1. Numerous (now over 40) "grant selection committees" should be
> > amalgamated to just a few. Their present activity is largely in
> > "peer-reviewing" of proposals which are almost invariably based
> > on already peer-reviewed published papers. There is no need to do
> > peer-review twice. This simply imposes an unfair "double
> > taxation" on the ideas, work and time of the researchers.  
> >                                    
> > 2. Out of 3 present NSERC criteria ("excellence of the
> > applicant", "excellence of proposals" and "need for funds") only
> > 1st and 3rd should be left. "Excellence of proposals" is largely 
> > a Red Herring. For all practical purposes, the presently used
> > 1-page form (NSERC form 180: "intent to apply") is FULLY
> > SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF, i.e. as a rule no "longer" proposals should
> > be written AT ALL. This will not only save many truckloads of
> > paper, but millions of hours of a highly qualified professional
> > labor (at $ 30 per hour at cheapest !) to write AND read the
> > typewritten compilations of already published papers.
> > (Longer proposals can be left as optional only for some special
> > cases, e.g. for group grants in high-energy physics, or for the
> > first-time applicants yet without published papers). 
> > In short: FUND RESEARCHERS, NOT PROPOSALS.
> > 
> > 3. The rat-race terminology (grant "selection" ; NSERC
> > "competition") should be eliminated from the documents and actual
> > policies. Its continuous use is harmful for the morale of the
> > entire community and sends a damagingly wrong message, especially
> > to young scientists, forcing many of them out of profession
> > and/or out of the country. Science can not and should not 
> > operate by the rules of beauty contests and wrestling games. ALL
> > university-based researchers whose active status can be sensibly
> > demonstrated, should be funded at some (basic) level using a
> > SLIDING FUNDING SCALE rather than NIL-awards (5). These basic
> > awards (we suggest to call them RBMG -  Research Base Maintenance
> > Grants) may not be great but they should cover such fundamental
> > expenses as any serious researcher has: publication and reprint
> > charges, conference travel, computing and software, electronic
> > networking, etc. The gradaute student support can be much more
> > efficiently met through the direct grants to the departments
> > where the students are being trained. We also note, that personal
> > research expenses which professors squize from their personal 
> > salaries are NOT TAX DEDUCTABLE !
> >  In any case:  NIL awards to ACTIVE researchers should not be
> > tolerated. This practice is based on an ill-conceived philosophy
> > of the alleged efficiency of a rat-race "competition" in science
> > when only peer-review defined "excellence" is to be rewarded. In
> > reality, NIL-awards amount to wasteful and irresponsible
> > mismanagement of the scientific and intellectual resources of
> > this country.
> > 
> > 4. It is imperative to obtain the views of the scientific
> > community on whether NSERC officials should be elected by all
> > those eligible for funding, and if found to be so, the electorial
> > process should be instituted. Nomination to NSERC bodies
> > (including the President) should be discussed PUBLICLY and in
> > advance, perhaps through a special bulletin. The candidates
> > should provide their platforms  and be open to public questioning
> > and criticism before they are elected to the office. They should
> > be regularly publicly accountable during their entire term in the
> > office. It is also critically important that the minority and
> > dissentering views are duly represented.
> > 
> > To conclude, contrary to a misleading similarity, the terms
> > "competitiveness" and "competition" are quite different. The real
> > competitiveness of research comes from open opportunities and NOT
> > from the enforced "competition" which in many cases directly
> > detrimental for the very spirit of the reasearch. We believe that
> > a wide and open public dialogue on the above issues is highly 
> > desirable for the strengthening of the economic efficiencey,
> > international competitiveness and social responsibility of the
> > canadian research enterprise. 
> > Alexander A. Berezin,                          
> > Department of Engineering Physics, McMaster University, Hamilton,
> > Ontario, L8S 4L7; (905) 525-9140 ext. 24546
> > email: BEREZIN at MCMASTER.CA
> > Geoffrey Hunter, 
> > Chemistry Department, York University, North York, Toronto,
> > Ontario, M3J 1P3; (416) 736-5306 email: FS300022 at SOL.YORKU.CA    
> > References
> > 1. A.K. Vijh, Canadian Chemical News, 42 (# 10), 14 (1990).
> > 2. A.A. Berezin, American Journal of Physics, 57, 392 (1989).
> > 3. L. Hocker, Physics Today, 46 (#8), 13 (1993).
> > 4. R.K. Merton, Science, 159, 56 (1968).
> > 5. D.R. Forsdyke, Nature, 312, 587 (1984).
> > ------------------------------------------------------
> > GUEST EDITORIAL  (published in international journal
> > "Drying Technolgy", vol. 13 (1&2), 1995).
> > 
> > 
> > RESEARCH FUNDING: SOME MYTHS 
> > 
> > Alexander A. Berezin (1) and Geoffrey Hunter (2)
> > 
> > (1) Department of Engineering Physics,
> > McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario,
> > Canada, L8S 4L7
> > 
> > (2)  Chemistry Department, York University,
> > Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M3J 1P3
> > 
> >    World-wide network of univeristy research is one of 
> > the major pillars of the modern civilization. Despite that
> > research and intellectual potential is, of course, not
> > entirely confined to university campuses, the economical,
> > social and cultural progress of today is unthinkable
> > without an open forum for new ideas facilitated and
> > validated by the international community of university
> > scholars. Therefore, the problem of balanced support for
> > university research within the realm of available means,
> > despite its appearence as a "local" problem, gains the
> > level of international significance.
> > 
> >    Numerous critics, speaking primarily of recent 
> > evolution of the North American model of university
> > research funding, have indicated damaging consequences
> > of ferocious competition for funds which are externally
> > "justified" by the presumption that such strategy fosters
> > "excellence" in research. At first glance the idea of
> > "excellence through competition" seems reasonable. It is
> > easy to sell to politicians and general public. After all,
> > if it works for business deals or Olympic games why it 
> > should not work for science ? However, as it often happens,
> > the argument fails by extension. The problem is that the
> > currently practiced regulating mechanisms of the externally
> > monitored competition in science ("grant selection") are
> > based on several underlying fallacies (myths) briefly
> > discussed below.
> > 
> >    MYTH OF "EXCELLENCE". Despite a nice sound, a careful
> > scrutiny of this term turns it to an empty clause. The true
> > measure of the long range impact of research is its
> > originality, NOT its apparent "soundness" and conformity to
> > currently dominant paradigms. A truly innovative research
> > proposal is unlikely to attract a smooth approval by grant
> > awarding committee or get high peer review marks. By the 
> > very way these judges are presently selected they tend to
> > be "paradigm keepers" rather than genuine innovation
> > searchers. Of course, no defence system is perfect and some
> > truly innovative reasearch "slips through" and gets funded,
> > especially if the applicants use proper decoys in their
> > grant applications. Nevertheless, many academic critics,
> > e.g., Nobel Prize laureate Albert Szent-Gyorgyi [1], have
> > pointed out that such fortunate occurences happen AGAINST
> > the dominant gradient of general suspicion (and often open
> > intolerance) to new ideas which is typical for almost any
> > committee of pre-appointed "experts". The viable alternative
> > to it is to fund RESEARCHERS (not proposals !) on the basis
> > of their overall record. Such a reform, however, will be
> > at odds with the present American project-oriented funding
> > model and also it will diminish the power of the
> > paper-shuffling bureaucracy and grantsmanship elite.
> > Therefore the idea "fund researchers, not proposals" [2] is
> > fiercely resisted by the research bureaucracy.
> > 
> >    MYTH OF IMPARTIAL PEER REVIEW. "Impartial peer review"
> > was, for example, recently stressed in the policy document
> > "Partnership in Knowledge" issued by the Natural Sciences
> > and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC). By
> > definition, peers are those who are themselves activly 
> > involved in the area. Consequently, they are never free
> > from vested interests in it. While it is, of course, true
> > that not all of them are evil or dishonest, with all good
> > will in the world they can't be "impartial". The benefit of
> > the doubt, therefore, should be with an applicant and a
> > reasonable implementation of it is a sliding funding scale
> > [3], not a policy of sharp cut-offs (pop-philosophy of 
> > "winners and loosers") which is presently the basis of
> > funding ideology of NSERC and other federal funding agencies 
> > in Canada and USA. The social purpose of funding agencies
> > is to ASSIST the university research, they SHOULD NOT have
> > de facto mandates of directing or controlling the paths of
> > free inquiry. Their present trend, however, is towards 
> > precisely the latter - a direct result of the bureaucratic
> > takeover in any unjustifably blown-up agency.
> >      
> >    MYTH OF "SUPERFUNDING FOR SUPER-RESEARCH". This is
> > another, seemingly sensible, but in essence perverted,
> > extrapolation of a business model to science. This myth has
> > two components:
> >    1) the "most promising" research with the best future 
> > "impact factor" CAN be correctly identified (by peer 
> > reviewers, expert panels, boards of directors, or whatever),
> > and
> >    2) putting "more money" into the so identified "excellent"
> > research is bound to make it even "more excellent".
> > 
> >    The first item is wishful thinking based on a presumption
> > of a "collective wisdom" of expert committees, the second is
> > based on traditional american aberration that "money can buy
> > everything". This is not just plainly naive, but also very
> > costly socially as it leads to an unwarranted overfunding of
> > many "polically correct" research activities like targetted
> > mega-projects, "centers of excellence", etc. This myth 
> > bluntly ignores all crucial non-monetary constraints of any
> > genuine research. In reality, even Albert Einstein, whose
> > grant is suddenly increased from, say, $ 50,000 per year 
> > to $ 200,000 per year WILL NOT produce "four times as many
> > discoveries". On the contrary, his real productivity will 
> > likely drop due to additional paperwork, new commitments,
> > etc. Yes, some modest bonus of, say, 30-50 % above average
> > for a "really good" (by whichever criteria) research may be
> > quite appropriate. However, the systematic policy of
> > preferential (over)funding of some "selected" groups at the
> > expense of zero "awards" to scores of other equally decent
> > researchers is nothing short of an arbitrary ideological
> > apartheid. Its consequences are especially damaging for 
> > the moral of the younger generation of university
> > researchers.        
> > 
> >    The typical university research program normally evolves
> > as a result of complicated ("nonlinear") interaction of
> > personal motivations of researchers and a web of social, 
> > micro-political and financial aspects of a specific research
> > case. Rich spectrum of personal motivations can range from 
> > the pure humility of research curiosity and selfless quest
> > for truth to a pragmatic (but socially still quite 
> > acceptable) aim of personal career gains and attaining the
> > sizable level of authority, influence and institutional
> > weight. In the present university reward system it is not
> > that rare that the latter traits detrimentally degenerate 
> > to the obsession with power control or personal enrichment
> > schemes. 
> >   
> >    It was mentioned earlier by E.Chargaff [4], the present
> > university system is based, to a large extent, on the 
> > exploitation of the young: graduate students, postdocs,
> > assistant professors. So far, the major currency unit in 
> > science is a "solid" peer-reviewed paper in a well acclaimed
> > mainstream journal. The more such units are accumulated, the
> > better is the bargining position in obtaining new funding,
> > hiring new postdocs, attracting even more new Ph.D. students,
> > etc. This vicious circle is self-serving and self-propelling.
> > The role model in today's academic science is "the boss" -
> > the head of a departmental mini-empire with 10 to 15 (above
> > listed) members of cheap research labour force with a net
> > output of some 20 to 40 papers per year. Though they are not
> > always entirely useless, the per-capita, per-paper 
> > (and per-dollar) innovation effect of such super-groups is,
> > as a rule, much lower than of small groups, or even of many
> > sole researchers. 
> > 
> >   In reality, the philosophy of "winners and loosers" has an
> > overall effect of a coercion of research into the avenue of
> > established paradigmas ("safe science") to satisfy the peer
> > reviewers and hence to assure the "fundability" of research
> > proposals [2]. At the end of the day, it is the very idea
> > of the peer review-enforced "excellence" through a brutal
> > "selectivity" which is a sure route to a mediocrity, NOT THE
> > OTHER WAY AROUND. The bulk of historic data suggests that it
> > makes more sense to fund MORE researchers at LOWER level to
> > maintain their research base - many important discoveries were
> > made with quite modest funding. What history of science
> > clearly DOES NOT show it that the overfunding of
> > super-research is a guaranteed roller coster to
> > super-excellence [5]. On the contary, numerous case studies
> > show that in accord with the universal Peter principle [6],
> > super-funded research usually quickly gears to its level of
> > incompetence. 
> > 
> >   To make the whole process less hostile and more time- and
> > resource-efficient, the awards of research grants should
> > be based exclusively on the long-term track record of the
> > applicant. Special provisions of a small bona fide grants
> > can be left for the junior applicants. Under the present
> > rat-race "competition for excellence" a university professor
> > with, say, one or two well thought-through papers per year has
> > virtually no chance to obtain funding at ANY level.
> > Implementation of the scheme "fund researchers, not proposals"
> > not only will make the process of funding more democratic and
> > socially responsible. It will also greatly reduce the paperwork
> > and raise the overall efficiency of university research. 
> > However, such reform will ALSO reduce the power base of the
> > grantsmanship elite. This is the prime reason why several
> > constructive proposals of this kind (e.g., [2,3] were bluntly
> > ignored by research funding bureaucracy.
> > 
> >    While some ranking of applicants and grant amounts is, of
> > course, appropriate, the policy of mass "zeroing" of active
> > university scientists is not only anti-intellectual in its
> > essence, but also is clearly contrproductive socially and
> > economically. It is time to re-orient the university system from
> > the obsolete idea of "competition" (it fails to deliver anyway)
> > to the cooperation and "win-win" science game. But so far, in a
> > search for winners the system still follows an old prescription:
> > "The mass trials have been a great success, comrades. In the
> > future there will be fewer but better Russians." (Greta Garbo
> > in "Ninotchka", 1939).
> > 
> > References
> > 
> > [1]  A. Szent-Gyorgyi, Science, 176, 966 (1972).
> > [2]  A.A. Berezin and G. Hunter, Canadian Chemical News,
> >      46 (#3), 4-5 (March 1994).
> > [3]  D.R. Forsdyke, Nature, 312, 587 (1984).
> > [4]  E. Chargaff, Persp.in Biol.& Medicine, 23, 370 (1980).  
> > [5]  B. Savan, Science Under Siege, CBC Enterprises,
> >      Toronto, (1988).  
> > [6]  L.J.Peter and R.Hull, The Peter Principle, Bantam Books,
> >      1969 (many other editions).
> > --------------------------------------------------------- 
> >  
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
>