Semantics and Syntactic Representations

Leslie Kay lmk2 at garnet.berkeley.edu
Mon Dec 6 14:49:50 EST 1993


In article <1993Dec4.202131.17151 at midway.uchicago.edu>,
Jacob Galley <gal2 at midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>
>Two easy questions:
>
>1) Can you give a reference for this work?  Has it been published yet?
>
>2) I have been reading some of the more recent and less technical
>papers coming out of Freeman's lab, but I have not yet found any
>explanation for the Kn notation that is used to refer to various
>models.  Can one of you refer me to a explanation of this notation or
>explain it briefly here?
>
Harry Erwin gave this information in a followup post, but I'll add
another reference, more recent, to cover the K0,KI,KII,KIII notation:
Freeman, W.J., Simulation of Chaotic EEG patterns with a Dynamic 
Model of the olfactory system, Biol. Cybern. 56 (1987) 139-150.

Briefly, a KO set represents a population of similar neurons, such
as the mitral and tufted cells in the OB, or the granule cells in
the OB.  A KI set is two populations of neurons interconnected with
feedback.  A KII set is two (or more) interconnected KI sets with
feedback, in the model this would refer to the representation of the
OB or the AON or the PPC.  A KIII set is the whole thing connected
with feedback delays (emphasis on the delays).

>A harder question:
>
>Leslie, I have been curious for a while about your and/or Walter
>Freeman's attitude toward the "enactive" paradigm proposed by
>Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Elanor Rosch in _The Embodied
>Mind_ (1991) and elsewhere.  Your research is quite compatible with
>their reasoning, yet I have only seen their work alluded to once in
>sources comimg out of Freeman's lab.  That one reference was in a
>short paper by Christine Skarda (1992) in a collection co-edited by
>Varela himself, _Understanding Origins_, which was in fact a direct
>reply to his recent book:

Since I haven't read the book, I don't want to say that I agree with
Varela, but based on the explanation you gave (deleted here), I'd say
that I lean toward that interpretation.  That gets away from the need
to store and compare things when trying to remember.  Memory then 
becomes a process rather than a "thing".  So, the perceptual state
or process is the perception, rather than a delivery of some static
(or even non-static) representation stored somewhere.

As far as the "lab" view or Freeman's view on this work, I don't 
pretend to speak for my colleagues.

Leslie Kay
lmk2 at garnet.berkeley.edu



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