I give up. It's hopeless.
In <Pine.A22.214.171.1240522181506.16947B-100000 at glibm8.cen.uiuc.edu>
Eugene Khutoryansky <ekhutory at glibm8.cen.uiuc.edu> writes:
>>>>On Thu, 22 May 1997, John H. Casada wrote:
>>> This seems to be developing into the kind of debate that will have
>> winners. Each side catrivial liguistic game and a trick of
>> don't tell me what I must think, ask me what I think and why.)
>gically consistent, that is your choice.
>> are some who jump lightly from the concept of "consciousness" to the
>> concept of "sensience" and treat these a
>>I doubt we are all using the same definitions of these words.
>to one dictionary definition, "sentience" is the ability to detect and
>respond to outside stimuli. But then, an electric bell would be
>sentient, and that is not what we were trying to convey. A similar
>definition of "conscious" which was offered in a previous post lead to
>the same result.
>>Here is the concept I am trying to convey. There are some people who
>believe in the existence of something similar to a "soul". To them,
>items such as electric bellsam trying to convey by the word
>"sentient" is something s
imilually perceives this stimuli. An electric bell
>does not count as an "observer". This is not a very good definition
>(since now I would have to define "observer", which I can not) but my
>point is that it is impossible tsume that other organisms are not
>until "proven" otherwise. As a result, they believe that other
>are not conscious. However, to be consistent, they would have to
>conclude that all human beings other than them self are not conscious
>either. This is due to the fact that it is also not possible to
>concrete evidence that other human beings are conscious.
>>The reason that I do believe that other animals (including humans) are
>conscious is through inductive reasoning. That is, I know that I am
>conscious. I know that other animals (including human beings) have
>visible characteristics which are similar to the ones I have. I
>therefore conclude that they are probably conscious.
>>>>> If we are to discuss "consciousness," then please let us agree on
>> we are talking about. If we are going to talk about a variety of
>> phenomena that we may (or legitimately may not) think are correlated
>> with "consciousness" then let us say so. But let's try to avoid
>> talking about "sensience" and pret
>>>>I needed to mention animal rights to demonstrate that there is indeed
>fundamental disagreement, and that it is not just a dispute over the
>definitions of words. By the way, believing that our own species has
>"rights", but that other species do n
>have equal moral obligations regarding both our own and other species.