Toward a Science of Consciousness 1998
rickert at cs.niu.edu
Thu Apr 23 23:18:25 EST 1998
modlin at concentric.net writes:
>In <6hodma$o2j at ux.cs.niu.edu>, rickert at cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>[ so I disagree with Bill ]
>No you don't.
Yes I do.
>>modlin at concentric.net writes:
>>>Hardware design is important in a lot of practical ways. A design must
>>>provide devices and channels for information to come into the system and
>>>out of it... sensors and effectors, in biological or robotic terms.
>>>Hardware design also determines how fast computations can proceed, and
>>>how much information can be stored and manipulated... all very important
>>>to the practicality of solving any particular computational problem.
>>>But hardware design has absolutely nothing to do with the kinds of
>>>things that can be computed,
>>To the extent that that is true, computation is irrelevant to
>>cognition. You could do all of the same computation on a Turing
>>machine with no devices and channels at all. And since there are no
>>channels, the Turing machine would have no world to cognize.
>You aren't disagreeing with me here, that is a totally separate point.
>The person to whom I was responding seemed to think that different
>architectures would allow different types of computation. That isn't
Of course it is true. I can do all kinds of things on my pentium
with 32 Meg of memory and 4G of disk space that were impossible on
the Z80 system I owned in 1980 (with 64K of memory and two 100K
> All computing architectures can compute the same things, which
>you know perfectly well.
But the original comment was about what can be computed in practice. It
was not an in-principle argument. And what can be computed in practice
can be very sensitive to aspects of the hardware.
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