Bloxy's at hotmail.com
Sat Mar 6 05:33:06 EST 1999
In article <36e08a1f.480850 at news-server>, ZZZghull at stny.lrun.com (Jerry Hull) wrote:
>On Fri, 05 Mar 1999 20:02:57 GMT, malcolm at pigsty.demon.co.uk (Malcolm McMahon)
>>On Fri, 05 Mar 1999 14:14:42 GMT, ZZZghull at stny.lrun.com (Jerry Hull)
>>>>>Which makes consciousness part of what?
>>>>God? Why does it have to be a part of anything, for that matter, why
>>>>can't it be just another part of the universe which "just is", like a
>>>>photon or an electron. Not everything is made of something.
>>>Everything is made of something;
>>No, only composite things are made of something. Elementary particles
>>are not. What's an electron made of?
>> if they were made of nothing they wouldn't be
>An electron is made of itself. What you want to say, I think, is that not
>everything is made of SOMETHING ELSE. But "made of" is a misleading notion in
>this context. It would be most proper to say that both consciousness and mind
>are made of BRAINS, &c.
And the final ruler is DNA, right?
So, you are just a host for the dna.
Why so much fuss here then?
> That is, surely Descartes was wrong to suppose that
>mentality involved a different kind of SUBSTANCE that things could be composed
>of, separate from physical things.
Even to this day there is no evidence to dismiss it.
>>> The puzzle is the relation between conciousness and mind, on your
>>>view. Why suppose, as you seem to, that consciousness is not mental?
>>Because it's not really _like_ any kind of mental processing. Thinking
>>is something we _do_, consciousness is something we _are_.
Oh, they think they are perfect bio-robots
and you come here and tell them that they ARE
Hey, good luck.
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>This supposes that everything mental is "processing". But why believe this?
>It is obviously arbitrary. Mental things include moods, desires,
>dispositions, states of belief, fundamental convictions, twinges, sensations,
>intentions, proclivities, attitudes, &c. &c. Some of these things obviously
>involve processes, but not all of them. There are also states, capabilities,
>But I would agree that consciousness does not FEEL like a process, i.e.,
>unlike digestion, it is not something that we sense going on. But vision need
>not feel like a process either, but that does not keep it from being USEFUL to
>regard vision as a process. How things feel, and how things are best
>analyzed, are two separate issues.
>>>there no "mental"?
>>Yes, but it's probably just the information content of the brain. It's
>>not a separate thing but as aspect, a way of looking at, the brain.
>You obviously CAN regard mental things as a way of looking at the brain, but
>you NEED NOT look at them that way. Aristotle, e.g., thought the brain was
>for cooling the blood. He associated thought with the heart. Are then mental
>things just a way of looking at the heart?
>You need to distinguish between what mental things are IN THEMSELVES, and what
>provides the best CAUSAL explanation of their existence. In themselves,
>mental things have nothing ESSENTIALLY to do with either brains or hearts,
>which is why both theories of their causal underpinings are LOGICALLY
>>> Is consciousness yet a third thing, in addition to minds
>>>and bodies? I mean, the metaphysical problems in this area are in part
>>>taxological, so the denial of a connection between consciousness & mind only
>>>seems to make them worse.
>>Yes, but consciousness exists, requires explaning and is not adequately
>>explained by the mind.
>But "mind" is not an EXPLANATION of consciousness -- it's just a NAME for the
>various phenomena associated with consciousness. If you are rejecting "mind"
>as an EXPLANATION of consciousness, then I entirely agree with you. It is not
>that kind of thing.
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