Liar42 liar42 at
Tue Aug 28 05:26:02 EST 2001

I did not find the "self" picture on your site good, as there was a bunch of
non-I stuff, and I stuff not well shown, but I do not wish to go into that here
nor generally on the net.

>... suggests that matching action occurs at various scales in the mammalian

I might not regard the mammal parts so relevant, and assume that various
relevant areas are older than mammal by far.

Your neural fixation might not be shared at all, though of course not entire
irrelevant, either.

>(...) suggest that many processes occurring within the mammalian brain
actually consist of a feedforward and a feedbackward component, mediated by a
matching action.<

As no areas are given one might just generally comment that various depends on
the area, so as areas tend to have their own functions, it seems obvious that
not just all there tends to be "feedworward" to all other areas.

> For example, Jeffrey Gray theorizes that one of the functions of the
neocortex is to create predictions, <

Not known to me.

Own I registers as central processor for that, front stuff for calculating out
at the command of own I, and upper stuff of the neocortex I assumed to do more
with motorics, and occipital and parietal to do with perception data
processing, and with temporal there are so many different areas that it starts
to get tricky.

So, generalized, I find Jeffrey Gray's theory wrong, and suggest he takes not
that different neocortex areas have different functions, and maybe buys himself
some old neurology book, studies various of the areas magically in energy
interlinks to learn more about differences there or otherwise gets himself data
about differences concerning neocortex areas.

> that are matched with actual sensory input inside the 'hippocampal
comparator' (Gray, 1995). <

What is meant by hippocampla stuff being a comparator?

And what makes you so sure that own I is not relevant concering various
hippocampal reactions?

Starting with own I commands / setting the focus for something / wanting

>Experimental findings suggest that matching also occurs within the auditory

You are very vague.

As a lay smurf in that one might assume stuff to do with hearing signals there
but not to do with all signals existing as such.

> The phenomenon of 'mismatch negativity' (MMN) indicates that predictive
chunks (ranging from simple sounds to complex linguistic utterances) are
matched against actual auditory input.<

And what if one listens to someone talking one does not know yet, so that one
does not have predictions what he is going to say?

Expectation however might have to do with language mode shunts, meaning that if
a speaker is speaking a language that one does not expect but as such knows
some words of, until realizing it is not the language one had expected but
another, various words might pass untransited to understanding until realizing
it is a certain language and then the words might start to make more sense.

It can be made more tricky if the person is not talking the expected language,
but another with heavy accent of the expected language, so the sounds first
still register to be of that language, until realizing it is an attempt in the
other language.

>A similar model for the visual cortex has been proposed by Rajesh Rao. This
model consists of a hierarchy of predictors through which
'perceptual residues' <

>are passed on (Rao, 1997). <

>Not only will a neural network model for such action be introduced in this

Be careful (not just) with back occipital to not overlook magic systems
relevances too far.

> also a case will be made for how both cognitive skill<


In my head there is not just one tiny thinking area, I registered two relevant
thinkers and both are IMO of systems clusters.

Their thinking skills are rather differing, 

and also what they are to do with.

My own I might have to do with a lot of certain sorts of stuff,
while the other is more to do with navigation and supervising motoric

Also our learning capacities and speeds are different and I assume also our
parallel processing capacities, that in the latter I assume to be higher than

Also the other registered to use memory stuff that I have no access to.

It registered to be able to independently think, learn, and that there is
memory stuff in context with that that I can not access directly.

Also I strongly suspect that we have differences in cooperations with other
stuff, or at least at somewhen in a job I came to deduct I better at least all
2 hours link in for a while and work along myself at least 20 minutes, as else
there might be problems for quite a while that seemed like cooperations not
being smooth enough anymore.

> and behavior can develop under a single regime that reinforces mismatch
reduction. <

What sort of regime?

In my language a sort of dictatorship / one ruling over the other might be
connected with the term.


Cognitions. And let me guess, different emotional systems in spite of how
different their emotions are are also not discerned between.

>One could ask why mismatch reduction is suggested to be a cognitive skill.<

(If hallucinating safe ground when there is a chasm might be unbecoming if not
noticing mismatches with reality? ;-)  And own I as a magic central among other
capacities  if trained for that or otherwise figuring it out might know how to
run the shunts to steer out of hallus or think about if something seems not
correct what that is and give according "commands".)

One could ask why cognitive systems are not discerned, 
and why a bunch of stuff should not tend more to harmonies than disharmonies.

> The answer is that in order to reduce the disagreement between sensory input
and generated predictions,<

Why should there be much disagreement with a bunch of stuff?

If I were to watch a tree, it is a tree.

I might not have the prediction there that it is a sky scraper or a pea.

> the predictions have to come from an increasingly powerful world model.<

For a lot of stuff it might not need any predictions to watch that at all.

Apart from that who knows all the world to really make a realistic world model
with all of those and that upon it?


>Finally, its performance can also improve because the network produces

What network produces what behaviour?

Maybe you might expect what is to adapt to your predictions, but that does not
alter that own I in my head is a lot to do with behaviour, hormone stuff can
also be to do with behaviour,
and a human spirit traveller does not tend to have a network along.

> that changes the environment in such a way that its unadjusted predictions
come to fit reality better.<

In other words a prediction is wrong and instead of realizing that the idea
here is to alter reality to make it fit the prediction.

So if my prediction were the Earth is a cube, one just chops off anyting
sticking over and blasts it into space with rockets built for that.

The it fits my prediction and is a cube.

As unfortunately now the gravity relations are altered, Earth course might
alter so much, that the trajectory around the sun might change, after which it
might become too bad for most of not all life forms on Earth, so that a lot of
death would be in the wake.

Minor details ...

> This last component of mismatch reduction provides us with an interesting
notion of 

behavior and cognition as two synergetic forces, <

It are lots of sectors, not just two, same going for their energies / forces.

You are just understanding so little about systems in the head&body, that you
try to simplify lots of systems down to just two, 
and keep not discerning between different systems functions.

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