Just a short comment:
The discrepancies mentioned by Kyle might perhaps also just be put down to
that there are two principal components (or 'bulk neurophysiological'
instrumentalities) of any consciousness (and of any content of
consciousness). Namely, the characteristically inertly (slowly and
tonically) responding and tardily nerve-signal transmitting "energizing" (or
"background tone" providing) component - one that I enjoy referring to as
"RAT (Reticular Activating Type) neurons" - and the rapidly and phasically
responding and quickly nerve-signal transporting "specific" component.
It is approximately so (and rather apparent) that a particular content of
"consciousness" can not become neurophysiologically established until the
"RAT neuron" component has had enough time to get established as part of a
transiently dominant actention module.
But once it has, the "specific" component "fools" us to perceive
By the way, both the specific and the nonspecific (or RAT;) component can be
tolerably (if roughly) defined/understood at least in part by considering
the phylogeny of adaptive sensory processing mechanisms.