The bulk of hos to best understand qualia and other subjective

Peter F. effectivespamblock at ozemail.com.au
Tue Apr 13 03:36:51 EST 2004


"John H." <johnh at faraway.> wrote in message
news:407a78b9 at dnews.tpgi.com.au...
> Can't understand it Peter. Not a hope. If possible, please elucidate what
> they are on about. They seem to be focussed on the "hard problem". These
> days I"m not even sure there is a problem.

Am afraid one of the baiting boys one-upped me, and summed it up, before I
saw your reply and had a chance to beat him to it. %-}

I vaguely remember that one fairly substantial philosophical point that I
extracted (or extrapolated?) from the first 'sensorimotor contingency paper'
I read by O'Regan and Noë  (not the one I reffed to this time) - one _other_
than the idea that (e.g.) the difference between being conscious of green as
distinct from red is not just the initial difference in wavelength but
_every_ difference in meaning such as what green is most likely to smell,
and taste, and feel like (e.g. grass against the skin) and what one is most
likely to do with things green, as distinct from the 'likewise meaty' ;-)
meaning of red - was that it is the actual physical existence of e.g. trees,
and that and how their properties have played a decisive interactive role in
the successful coping and survival of our ancestors, that makes our
consciousness of trees such a self-evident (qualia-quashing) state of our
(normal, human-primate) being.

Regards,

P







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