Bennett and Hacker: Village Idiots or Philosophers?

AlphaOmega2004 OmegaZero2003 at yahoo.com
Wed Feb 11 10:16:55 EST 2004


"Eray Ozkural exa" <erayo at bilkent.edu.tr> wrote in message
news:fa69ae35.0402110159.5a3eee8f at posting.google.com...
> "AlphaOmega2004" <OmegaZero2003 at yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<2b87008a9fd70789cb534988f584011a at news.teranews.com>...
> > I think the conceptual error these guys make is that one cannot explain
the
> > psychological terminology by reference to neuropsychological concepts.
> >
> > These are *all* bona fide *ways* of conceptualizing a space that is
> > multi-dimensional in the broadest sense.  TO think one can divorce the
> > psychological from the neuropsychological is non sense.
> >
>
> The problem with these authors is that they have published the book in
> 2003, while it seems to me it should have been published around 1930s
> or 1940s when Wittgenstein was worshipped by many. Ah, still the
> church of Wittgenstein thrives I guess, and I pity that I'm not a
> priest and true believer (in God) from time to time. Anyway, you get
> the idea. If it weren't for an absolute conviction in the truth of
> what Wittgenstein said and his followers, there wouldn't be such a
> book. That's an important point.
>
> Note also that the authors have written some serious non-sense. In
> particular, this one:
>
>   "It is wrong, *conceptually* wrong, to suppose that memory is always
> of the past, or to think that memories can be *stored* in the brain in
> the form of the strength of synaptic connections (Kandel, Squire,
> Bennett)."
>
> As a computer scientist, I know very well what "memory" is, and *that*
> our intuitive notion of "memory" coincides with the technical term of
> memory, *and* furthermore that it also corresponds to "memory" in
> neural associative memory models, etc. That is to say, there is *no*

I agree.

One point though - there is a philosophical position that memory is a
regenerative process.  That is, once the appropriate NCC's are activated
(becoming the casual agent for the personal experience of a memory), the
memory is regenerated from those processes each time. Aeach time they
regenerate, the processes that accept the memory process inputs *are* the
content of consciousness proper.

This avoids the content-match conundrum (athe notion that sub_personal
processes cannot match personal_experential processes) posited by Noe et al
in the current Journal Of Consciousness Studies.




> conceptual mistake. And I also direct your attention to the stupid
> blurb about "the past". Oh, memory is not of the past, great, then
> perhaps it is of future? Trust me, this is non-sense. I agree with the
> authors in that a good philosopher must be able to distinguish sense
> from non-sense, but so must a scientist and from both perspectives
> their statement is pure non-sense.
>
> That's why I think they sounded more like village idiots than
> philosophers when they said such things. They say even sillier things
> about computationalism as Pierre demonstrated, you can knock down
> their arguments with a single analogy.
>
> Regards,
>
> --
> Eray Ozkural





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