death of the mind.

David Longley David at longley.demon.co.uk
Mon Jul 12 09:30:25 EST 2004


In article <6e2f1d09.0407120459.6592e22c at posting.google.com>, Glen M. 
Sizemore <gmsizemore2 at yahoo.com> writes
>JL: Actually, Glen didn't know what cog sci is until a few days ago
>when I
>straightened him out. What does that say about the class of
>individuals
>that both you and Glen have spent time teaching? Have you spent
>any time looking into why a modern science of behaviour, equipped with
>the tools and techniques that serve the rest of science so admirably,
>has largely rendered moot issues of intensional or referential
>opacity?

What JL doesn't appear to appreciate is that (and GS says much the same 
below once again) it is precisely because I *HAVE*

"spent.. time looking into why a modern science of behaviour, equipped 
with the tools and techniques that serve the rest of science so 
admirably, has largely rendered moot issues of intensional or 
referential opacity?"

That is, the EAB and Applied Analysis of Behaviour (PROfiling and 
PROgramming Behaviour) does precisely that. The covers of the 10 volumes 
of the PROBE project have two sets of symbols on it. One set comprises 
those of the basic connectives of the predicate calculus, quantifiers, 
and Leibniz Law, and the other the equation for logistic regression. I 
referred JL not only to "Fragments" (which is volume 1 of the PROBE 
project and to the papers on "What Works"), but to volume 2 which 
covered the pilots run in two maximum security prisons over a two year 
period. Note, these were not minor "experiments" but systems of regime 
and sentence management for an entire prison population. JL could also 
have tried to find out about volume 3 which provided the system's 
functional specification, or to volume 4 which provided the physical 
specification, or volumes 5 onwards which provided the schemas/data 
dictionaries, 4GL code and non pilot illustrative actuarial data drawn 
from the national 10 year project. Or perhaps to the "Overview and 
Reviews" which are available through this newsgroup, written by (with 
one exception) other applied psychologists. They knew the project 
criticised their practices too. They were instructed to write *critical* 
reviews. You can see that by what they wrote in the reviews.

In other words, yes, I do know. The question is, does JL? If not, WHY 
not? Why do we see him, and others waste so much time making the remarks 
they do from such clear (to me) positions of *ignorance*? Why do people 
behave this way?

The last sentence is rhetorical as that's what I am talking about. 
People here should ask what THAT reveals about the problematic nature of 
what I keep referring to as "intensional or referential opacity" or the 
failure of Leibniz Law in intensional contexts. That is the subtle point 
which I suggest he (and others) keep missing. They miss this year after 
year after year - despite all the "reading" and counting that they do. 
What was the second and third quote that "Fragments" opens with?

http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm


Refs:

<http://www.google.co.uk/groups?selm=874980870snz@longley.demon.co.uk>

<http://www.google.co.uk/groups?selm=cDF8fiyqK3e$EwHW@longley.demon.co.uk
 >

<http://www.google.co.uk/groups?selm=4pno8o%2477l%40totara.its.vuw.ac.nz&
output=gplain>
>
>GS: The experimental analysis of behavior is the modern scientific
>study of behavior. Everything else is mentalism and purports to be
>about some set of dimensions other than what is measured and
>manipulated.
>
>
>JL: Although physicists and biologists are ultimately committed to the
>extensional stance, they may speculate, hypothesize, employ fanciful
>metaphors and even intensionality from time to time - anything that
>helps. Cognitive scientists are no different, and that's how they
>differ from behaviourists.
>
>GS: Cognitive "scientists" differ from behaviorism in that they (CS)
>are incautious with their concepts. Metaphors are useful in science
>but only if they can eventually have a non-metaphorical meaning. It is
>a mistake to confuse the sort of speculation that takes place in
>physics with the verbal promiscuity of cognitive "scientists." This is
>a favorite ploy of lamers like Joe; "See, we're just like physicists.
>Aren't we so very clever?" This is scientism, not science.
>
>As to me not knowing exactly what you were referring to as "cognitive
>science," I wouldn't make so much of it. So some lamers throw together
>a bunch of tenuously related fields under the impetus of a mistaken
>conceptualization of behavior and walk around declaring their
>cleverness and sophistication. Big deal.
>
>
>Joe Legris <jalegris at xympatico.ca> wrote in message
-- 
David Longley



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