death of the mind.

Glen M. Sizemore gmsizemore2 at
Wed Jul 21 06:15:24 EST 2004

Science needs to make models at the right time, and at a level commensurate
with their current experimental control. The first step, in the case of a
subject matter that is accessible to manipulation, is to directly obtain the
functions that prevail between independent and dependent variables. Another
thing that science must have is conceptual analysis - one must be
painstakingly obsessed with the assumptions and fundamental concepts
underlying the science. Psychologists are taught that the answer to all
problems is more experimentation, but it could be argued, as I am doing,
that no amount of experimentation can save a bad conceptual structure.

"Sergio Navega" <snavega at> wrote in message
news:40fd4f68$1_6 at
> "David Longley" <David at> escreveu na mensagem
> news:3Kzm9DH05T$AFwVB at
> > >
> > How does anything that you write above impugn the point that "thinking",
> > "seeing" etc is private behaviour? Why does being able to show that
> > blood flows in areas of the brain which are "active" when people
> > actually see people smiling etc *and* when they just "think" about this
> > in any way impugn the value of treating this as behaviour? On the
> > contrary, it would seem to do exactly the opposite through bringing some
> > reference to such behaviour under some control of the reinforcing
> > (verbal) community - ie by rendering it public. The writing is on the
> > wall for intensionalist cognitivism, not for behaviour analysis and
> > behavioural neuroscience.
> The question is not to impugn behaviorism (at least, in my way of
> seeing things). I'm not "against" behaviorism (I have some Skinner
> books and also Baum's). The best book about behavior change I have
> is "Principles of Behavior Change", by Edward Sarafino. It's a
> wonderful book, so much better than much of what we have with
> psychoanalisis. So I don't want to bury behaviorism.
> I am against artificial attempts to prevent the creation of
> insightful scientific models. If we have today ERP, PET, fMRI, TMS
> and other techniques for "peeking" at the brain while it's working,
> we have a good chance to really make progress with our models (and
> in science we *do* need to make models; in AI this is absolutely
> essential). If one cognitive scientist proposes a falsifiable
> model and it turns out to be falsified (by behavioral data or
> by neurobiological means), then I think this theory should really
> be thrown away, and not because it was not developed the way
> radical behaviorists wanted.
> Sergio Navega.

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