death of the mind.

dan michaels feedbackdroids at
Sat Jul 24 02:01:13 EST 2004

erayo at (Eray Ozkural  exa) wrote in message news:<fa69ae35.0407231857.334fa4b2 at>...
> feedbackdroids at (dan michaels) wrote in message news:<8d8494cf.0407220958.2d08e14 at>...
> > erayo at (Eray Ozkural  exa) wrote in message news:<fa69ae35.0407220601.2cc94db3 at>...
> > > Let's please avoid equating metaphysical materialism with behaviorism.
> > > 
> > > My digital multism, for instance, is metaphysical materialism, but it
> > > is by no means behaviorism. Machine functionalism is materialist as
> > > well, but it is not behaviorism.
> > > 
> > > Regards,
> > 
> > 
> > You'll have to take the terminology issue up with Adler. As I see it,
> > not all materialism is beh, nor dogmatic. My materialism is neither,
> > of course. Does your DM dogmatically assert the truth of the
> > nonexistence of things unprovable? I doubt it. According to Adler,
> > making working assumptions are not the error, but asserting dogmatism
> > as truth is error.
> Agreed. By "metaphysical materialism" he might mean something else.
> DM does not dogmatically assert that things unprovable do not exist.
> We can discuss it; it's an interesting thought. If something is not
> provable, does it exist?

Maybe you just don't have the technology to be able to discover it.
Like radio waves to the caveman. Like the existence of 10s of billions
of galaxies that were only a smear on a lens prior to Hubble.

And try asking it the other way around. If something does not exist,
can you prove it does not exist? That's harder. Can you prove there
are not 4-dimensional creatures who can see simultaneously both the
insides and outsides of your body as normal - like Francis Bacon [the
modern one] ugly paintings.

> If a (sufficiently powerful) formal system is consistent, is its
> consistency provable (in the same system)? Godel's theorem says
> interesting things about that. Oh, I think I'm getting a headache! [A
> Godel "expert" could pop up at any instant!] The answer is no. It has
> to be proved somewhere else.

Yes, Gödel has you by the scruff of the neck.

> According to Godel, the second incompleteness theorem holds for finite
> systems as well. Our universe seems to be finite.
> But "consistency" is a condition, it is not material "existence"
> itself, so such conditions could exist in a non-material sense. I
> think there is nothing strange about a proposition about a computable
> universe being true, which itself is not computable... [As much as I
> sound like Lester when I talk about the non-material]
> I'm aware that the above reasoning does not seem coherent, however, it
> would be made all the more plausible if we understand that finite
> beings can answer only a tiny part of the unknowable metaphysical
> propositions such as those about the  "consistency of the universe"
> (which is not too sensible anyway! what would an inconsistent universe
> be like!!!???).
> Regards,
> --
> Eray Ozkural
> PS: Thus, I do think material existence has something to do with
> computability, but I prefer to avoid equating existence in general
> with all imaginable propositions (at the present).  For the record, I
> do not imply that minds are non-material, either. Quite the opposite.
> I tend to think they can be identified as locality of energy, or
> something just as physical.

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