death of the mind.
lesterDELzick at worldnet.att.net
Sat Jul 24 10:57:19 EST 2004
On 24 Jul 2004 00:01:13 -0700, feedbackdroids at yahoo.com (dan michaels)
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>erayo at bilkent.edu.tr (Eray Ozkural exa) wrote in message news:<fa69ae35.0407231857.334fa4b2 at posting.google.com>...
>> feedbackdroids at yahoo.com (dan michaels) wrote in message news:<8d8494cf.0407220958.2d08e14 at posting.google.com>...
>> > erayo at bilkent.edu.tr (Eray Ozkural exa) wrote in message news:<fa69ae35.0407220601.2cc94db3 at posting.google.com>...
>> > > Let's please avoid equating metaphysical materialism with behaviorism.
>> > >
>> > > My digital multism, for instance, is metaphysical materialism, but it
>> > > is by no means behaviorism. Machine functionalism is materialist as
>> > > well, but it is not behaviorism.
>> > >
>> > > Regards,
>> > You'll have to take the terminology issue up with Adler. As I see it,
>> > not all materialism is beh, nor dogmatic. My materialism is neither,
>> > of course. Does your DM dogmatically assert the truth of the
>> > nonexistence of things unprovable? I doubt it. According to Adler,
>> > making working assumptions are not the error, but asserting dogmatism
>> > as truth is error.
>> Agreed. By "metaphysical materialism" he might mean something else.
>> DM does not dogmatically assert that things unprovable do not exist.
>> We can discuss it; it's an interesting thought. If something is not
>> provable, does it exist?
>Maybe you just don't have the technology to be able to discover it.
>Like radio waves to the caveman. Like the existence of 10s of billions
>of galaxies that were only a smear on a lens prior to Hubble.
>And try asking it the other way around. If something does not exist,
>can you prove it does not exist? That's harder. Can you prove there
>are not 4-dimensional creatures who can see simultaneously both the
>insides and outsides of your body as normal - like Francis Bacon [the
>modern one] ugly paintings.
It might be easier to prove there aren't four dimensions.
>> If a (sufficiently powerful) formal system is consistent, is its
>> consistency provable (in the same system)? Godel's theorem says
>> interesting things about that. Oh, I think I'm getting a headache! [A
>> Godel "expert" could pop up at any instant!] The answer is no. It has
>> to be proved somewhere else.
>Yes, Gödel has you by the scruff of the neck.
>> According to Godel, the second incompleteness theorem holds for finite
>> systems as well. Our universe seems to be finite.
>> But "consistency" is a condition, it is not material "existence"
>> itself, so such conditions could exist in a non-material sense. I
>> think there is nothing strange about a proposition about a computable
>> universe being true, which itself is not computable... [As much as I
>> sound like Lester when I talk about the non-material]
>> I'm aware that the above reasoning does not seem coherent, however, it
>> would be made all the more plausible if we understand that finite
>> beings can answer only a tiny part of the unknowable metaphysical
>> propositions such as those about the "consistency of the universe"
>> (which is not too sensible anyway! what would an inconsistent universe
>> be like!!!???).
>> Eray Ozkural
>> PS: Thus, I do think material existence has something to do with
>> computability, but I prefer to avoid equating existence in general
>> with all imaginable propositions (at the present). For the record, I
>> do not imply that minds are non-material, either. Quite the opposite.
>> I tend to think they can be identified as locality of energy, or
>> something just as physical.
Regards - Lester
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