Questions on the Nature of memory, personality, etc.

David Longley David at longley.demon.co.uk
Tue May 11 08:53:52 EST 2004


In article <85d56b27.0405110449.3f7e1ffc at posting.google.com>, Robert 
M?rtin <robertmaertin at gmx.de> writes
>No. To be "in the field" usually entails that you support the basic
>assumptions of physicalism. This notion extends beyond empirical
>science... if you want to participate in contemporary debates about
>philosophy of mind, you have to be a physicalist and be open to
>advances in science.
>But a modern philosopher should be able to deal with these
>prerequisites.
>
>Creationism and dualism are no real threat to neuroscience or the
>image of ns in the public.
>Strange half-scientific psychological theories (not only
>Psychotheraphy) that are both easy to understand and catchy are the
>real problem of neuroscience... (my opinion)
>
>regards
>Robert
>
>qquito at hotmail.com (Quito Quito) wrote in message 
>news:<98d60386.0405101756.1c1dfd75 at posting.google.com>...
>> Robert, thank you for your informative reply. I definitely agree with
>> you. Are there many people in the neurobiology/neurobiopsychology
>> field who disagree with
>> this materialistic philosophical view of the world?

I think you'll find that the problems lie much deeper than you make out. 
It is one thing to assert that one's a physicalist, it's a lot harder to 
practice that. In some areas of neuroscience the problems just don't 
arise. They manifest themselves in much more subtle and insidious ways 
elsewhere.
-- 
David Longley



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