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Sun Apr 10 21:20:03 EST 2005


you can pick out as consciousness, but you can identify subjective
experiences with active internal representations. The common arguments
against this are i) that our internal experiences are nothing like
patterns of firing neurons(viz. the active internal representations),
and ii) that no matter how much we study (e.g.) a frog's brain, we will
never know what it's like to be a frog, so we do not know about its
subjective experiences(qualia).

My counterarguments are:

i) that we are not aware of the nature of our own subjective experiences.
The only thing we can accomplish is to say how they relate to each other(e.g.
orange seems to be a mixture of red and yellow). This is exactly in keeping
with my model of consciousness. And

ii) If we study a frog's brain enough, we *can* know what it's like to
be a frog, because we would know all the information in his brain, so
if he knows what it's like to be a frog then so do we. What we cannot
do is *experience* what it's like to be a frog. This is obvious, because it's
just saying that studying a frog will not make me a frog.

>> --
>> Ruadhan O'Flanagan



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