IUBio Biosequences .. Software .. Molbio soft .. Network News .. FTP

[Neuroscience] Re: Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

Glen M. Sizemore via neur-sci%40net.bio.net (by gmsizemore2 At yahoo.com)
Fri Dec 8 10:34:53 EST 2006





Glen M. Sizemore wrote:


> MJ: sigh. I knew this would happen.
>
>
>
> GS: Sigh. So did I - you are insufferably arrogant. And despite the fact
> that I dislike you intensely, I tried to keep the ad hominems out of it. 
> I'm
> still trying.

MJ: Right, Glen. I'm sure everybody who reads your posts is very impressed
with how much restraint you show in keeping personal insults out of
your repetitive diatribes. You are the veritable soul of politeness and
gentle wit.



GS: Are you suggesting that you are? I stand by my assessment of you. You 
are arrogant, and you have the intellectual integrity of a 6th grade 
creationist.


> MJ: Mereology is a branch of formal logic that deals
> with the rules of how "parts" relate to each other and to "wholes"
...
> Essentially it deals with the same sorts of concepts as set theory, but
> with some basic twists in definitions and rules of inference.
>
> GS: Not exactly. The formal systems are just that - attempts to formalize
> the treatment of the relation of parts to wholes and parts to each other,
> which has wound its way through philosophy for thousands of years.

MJ: "Not exactly"? Buy yourself a dictionary, and look up the word
"mereology". Or try this one online: http://dictionary.reference.com/



GS: Right. Not exactly - from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"The study of wholes and parts is known as mereology. This article is an 
introduction to mereology as it is practiced in the Latin West, starting 
with Boethius in the sixth century A.D. and ending in the fourteenth 
century. It will highlight key medieval mereological concepts and principles 
and outline some of the fundamental issues that confront mereologists in the 
Middle Ages.  Specific philosophers and their doctrines will be used to 
illustrate some of these concepts, principles, and puzzles. Many of these 
concepts and principles may seem strange to the modern student of parts of 
and wholes, but behind this alien veneer one will see that medieval 
mereologists share many of our concerns about wholes, their parts, and the 
metaphysical implications of mereology."

Was the formal system you are talking about around in the 6th century, Matt? 
A wise (and intellectually honest) man (you should try that sometime) once 
said that if you want to find out the meaning of a term, throw out your 
dictionary. Perhaps the issue isn't as cut-and-dried as you assume, eh Matt?

Focusing on this is simply more of your obfuscation.

MJ: There could be all manner of
> mereological fallacies, including the superstitious idea that the whole
> is something *other* than the sum of its parts and their interactions.
>
> GS: But this is not what B&H are talking about. It is not a matter,
> necessarily, of something being "more than the sum of its parts." Can you
> read?

MJ: Uh, yes. I can read. By the way, how's that dictionary thing coming
along?


GS: How's that dishonest obscurantism of yours coming?

> GS: The things people say cannot be reduced to logic or set theory.

MJ: It comes as no surprise that you think what people say cannot be
expressed using logic.



GS: Ok, express this in logic: "When the stimulus was present, firing rates 
increased in 83% of the neurons" or some such. What about "Water please." 
Formal logic is applicable to some of what people say, and it is obviously 
important. But much of science, for example, involves the logical fallacy 
called "affirming the consequent," as does, in a sense much of behavior. 
When a child learns to flip a switch to turn a light on and off, the child 
is, at least in some sense, a "victim" of faulty logic. So is the 
neuroscientist that says "firing rates increased because the stimulus was 
present. "

MJ: But of course that depends on what is being said, . I can say "Socrates
is a liar. All philosophers are liars, Socrates was a philosopher,
therefore Socrates is a liar." This is directly expressable in symbolic
logic:

Let:
Philosopher = P
Socrates = S
Liar = L

Premises:
\/P(IsA(PL)) (For all philosophers, a philosopher is a liar)
IsA(SP) (Socrates is a philosopher)

Conclusion:
IsA(SL) (Therefore Socrates is a liar)


I could have merely declared that "Socrates is a liar", and left it
that without offering any logical argument. That would be fine, but it
would just be my opinion and nobody should have to take it seriously.



GS: You mean like "firing rates increased"? Should we take that seriously? 
Is that statement generated via the laws of logic? To a great extent, 
science is about generating premises, not about the manipulation of verbal 
behavior called logic.  This is not to say that logic and mathematics is not 
important, it is to say the notion that all utterances can be viewed as 
somehow generated via logic is absurd.



MJ: However, if I say  "Symbolic logic demonstrates that Socrates is a
liar", then I damn well better be able to generate a PROOF. If I can do
that, then it should be taken seriously (it may still be false if one
of my premises is false, but at least it would be logical). If I can't,
then I should be rigorously ignored or ridiculed.



GS: When you say "firing rates increased because the stimulus was presented" 
is that the result of the formal activity we call "logic"? I have pointed 
out that it is a logical fallacy - but that is how a lot of science works.



MJ: By using the phrase "mereological fallacy", Bennet & Hacker are
implying that they can generate a PROOF, using the formal logical
system of mereology, that leads unerringly from their premises to their
conclusions. I haven't read the book, so I don't know if they did that
or not (doubt it). But if they didn't, then they are being dishonest.
And even if they have such a proof, whether their conclusion is true
will still depend on what their premises are and whether they are all
true.



GS: I have already dealt with this.

> To hold
> otherwise is an assumption. Just deal with the issue as presented instead 
> of
> obfuscating.

MJ: The issue as presented is whether or not there is any logical basis to
believe
that neuroscience is barking up the wrong tree by making statements
like "the brain thinks". B & H are implicitly claiming that there is
indeed a SYMBOLIC LOGICAL basis. If that's the case, then they need to
show a proof.



GS: Is there any logical basis to believe that "firing rates increased 
because the stimulus was presented"? All we observe is that firing rates go 
up whenever we present the stimulus. When we observe this enough times, we 
say that stimulus presentation is making firing rates go up. This is not 
logic, it is behavior, and it is science, and it is a logical fallacy.



>Is it proper to refer to a part of a complex system with terms
> used to describe the whole?

MJ: That depends. Often the answer is yes. I can look down from a
helicopter on a river (a complex system) and say "that river has a
strong current", or I can stand up to my ankles in one little eddy of
the same river and say "this river has a weak current". I'm not talking
about the whole river any more (who's current would wash me away), but
I am using the same terms and I am using them correctly in both cases.
So your knee-jerk cries of "Foul!" whenever the same word comes up in
two different contexts of scale are just bogus, lame, time-wasting
subterfuges.



GS: The issue is not scale, but one of parts and wholes. The river is the 
river whether you are looking at it from a helicopter or the bank. But if 
you take some of the water with you in a canteen, the river is not in the 
canteen. But, you are right about one thing; there is subterfuge, lameness, 
and "bogusicity" here, but you are the source.


> Is a steering wheel a car?

MJ: No. But it is the part of the car that does the steering.

The brain is not a person. But it is the part of the person that does
the thinking.



GS: But we say "I drove the car," not "I drove a steering wheel." We say "I 
think we should camp here," not "My brain thinks we should camp here." Or 
perhaps I should recast that in the third person - I guess in the interest 
of furthering your obscurantist ways you could say that saying "I" is really 
the brain saying "I" (despite its lack of a mouth or vocal apparatus).



But you have missed the point in a way that is deeper than implying that 
ordinary usage is somehow wrong, but I reckon that saying it one more time 
won't help, but I'll run it by you - or rather over your head - one more 
time. If "thinking" or "remembering" etc. is what is to be explained, one 
cannot explain it by using the same term, for that is what is to be 
explained. How does the term move from name to explanation? Ah, but I have 
said that already, no?


> Would you argue that
> a person thinks? A person decides? Would you argue that these idiomatic
> expressions are somehow wrong? How is it that people think? How is it that
> they decide? How could these things be explained by saying that some part 
> is
> doing these things?


MJ: The person steers car.
The steering wheel steers the car.
The car steers off the road.



All of the above are perfectly valid uses of the word "steers".



GS: None of this is to the point as far as I can see. None of this is the 
mereological fallacy. What is your problem?



MJ: I can
indeed (and all of us regularly do) use the same terminology to
describe the actions of a whole object (car) and various parts that
make it up (steering wheel). Often it is fine, but in some cases it
doesn't make any sense.  Both of the following are *logically,
syntactically and semantically* appropriate phrases:

I understand how to play this piece of music.
My brain understands the music, but my fingers haven't gotten the hang
of it yet.



GS: You're out of your alleged mind. The second is so far from idiomatic 
that it is absurd. If it ever becomes acceptable it won't be because it 
makes sense, it will be because the mereological fallacy has become an 
institution.


> And if the hippocampus "remembers," what about each cell?

MJ: Sure, each cell remembers that little piece of information that it's
responsible for. But they all have to work together to generate the
whole memory that we refer to when we say the person remembers
something. (Actually a lot more of the brain is involved in that than
just the hippocampus.)

> Each post-synaptic receptor? Each molecule making up each cell? Does each
> molecule "remember"?

Depending on the context, yes, yes and yes. Each stores the type of
information appropriate to it, over the time scales appropriate to it.
All are a form of memory. They are obviously not the SAME thing as a
person remembering something, but each of your examples is a COMPONENT
of the final person-level memory, and it is perfectly appropriate to
use the word "memory" in each case, as long as one is quite clear about
which scale is being described.

If you don't like that way of discussing things, then don't use it.
But spare us the repetitive unhelpful tirades.



GS: All you have done is assert what you have all along. You haven't argued 
cogently against my "tirades" and you can't even get your analogies correct. 
Until the meaning of the term is hijacked by the mereological fallacy 
(unfortunately large) subculture it would be quite absurd to say that "John's 
hippocampus remembered the beer." This should tell you something but it won't 
because you are part of the subculture. You have tacitly agreed that the 
fallacy is ok, and you then proceed to say the most outlandish nonsense. 
Your right about one thing though, once the subculture is in agreement, the 
statement sounds no more absurd than "this man is possessed by demons," a 
locution not far from the crap you spew. Talking about the hippocampus 
remembering is a bit like animism.

>
> MJ: Ah. You've been experimenting with mercury. Probably without gloves or
> respiratory protection. That explains a lot.
>
>
>
> GS: Maybe. But what explains your chronic obfuscation and ad hominems?

MJ: Oh, I just like doing that stuff to piss you off. Is it working?



GS: A little. But the corruption of the scientific enterprise is what 
concerns me the most. It is a profound tragedy that the entire field -right 
down to in vitro guys like you - is populated by arrogant shits that run 
about patting themselves on the back as they spew what is literally 
nonsense.

> MJ: Really? Please provide a citation for a behaviorist publication that
> includes a formal mereological proof, or for that matter, even using
> the word "mereology" in a publication. Or were you just making that up?
> Oh, or is it really you who doesn't understand what a mereological
> fallacy is?
>
>
>
> GS: Sigh. Behaviorists have argued for decades that saying the brain, or
> parts of the brain, can be said to do the things that whole persons are 
> said
> to do is stupid (would you like the citations?).  That is the meaning of 
> the
> mereological fallacy as used by B&H. I have already discussed formal
> treatments of this issue as just that; ATTEMPTS to formalize an issue that
> has pervaded philosophy and science for a long, long time. Quit 
> obfuscating
> and make some sort of substantive argument.

MJ: Have you managed to find that dictionary yet? No? Ok, I'll help you
out.

Here is what Webster's New Millenium Dictionary gives for the word
"mereology"
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/mereology
1) the formal theory and study of part-whole relationships; this branch
of logic.
2) Boolean algebra that excludes the null class.

Here is what the "Free Online Dictionary of Philosophy" says:
http://www.swif.it/foldop/dizionario.php?query=mereology&action=search
1) branch of logic that studies part-whole formal relationships. See
set theory.

Encyclopedia Britannica:
http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/article-9371896
1) Branch of logic, founded by Stanislaw Lesniewski, that studies class
expressions and the relations between parts and wholes. It rejects the
hierarchy of sets generated in set theory through the member-of
relation and instead proposes a part-whole relationship.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
This one is really excellent, and way too long to print here, but just
to give you a flavor, here's a snippet:

"we have the following definitional identities whenever the relevant
existential presuppositions are satisfied:
(50) x+y = sz(Pzx    Pzy)
(51) x ? y = sz(Pzx & Pzy)
(52) x?y = sz(Pzx & ¬Ozy)
(53) ~x = sz¬Ozx
(54) U = szPzz

 (It may be instructive to compare these identities with the
definitions of the corresponding set-theoretic notions, with set
abstraction in place of the fusion operator.) "


Wikipedia has a nice entry on mereology also:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereology

GS: Too bad you didn't read the beginning of the Stanford piece.



MJ: If all of the above just looks like more of my obfuscatory gobbledygook
to you, that must be because it (ALL of it, did you notice?) has to do
with FORMAL LOGIC, and NOT behaviorist psychology.



GS: You're truly pathetic. Does your arrogance and ignorance know any 
bounds?

MJ: So your discussion of how behaviorists have known all about mereology
for a million years and are old hands at shooting down mereological
fallacies would suggest that there oughta be some formal logical proofs
somewhere in that literature. Ok, now you may provide the citations to
those hundreds of behaviourist papers about mereology that you
promised.

Go ahead.  I'll wait.



GS: Idiot.


> MJ: That's a pretty narrow view of behavior. You seem to think behavior
> requires arms and legs or something like that, and since there aren't
> any arms or legs inside the head then behavior can't occur there. I
> disagree. If a person moves their arm, that's obviously behavior. But
> the arm moves because the nerves tell it to. So the activity of the
> nerves is more fundamental to behavior than the actual arm movement.

MJ: <snip>  - I'm snipping just to conserve space, not to shortchange you.
If anyone else is reading this, they should go back to your previous
post to see the full text of what you wrote.



GS: You should have read it.


> Now let's examine the sense in which the activity of the nerves is more
> fundamental to behavior than the actual arm movement.

MJ: < here you described training a rat to press a lever by building up
contingencies between its actions and a food reward - i.e., classical
operant conditioning through reinforcement, I believe, but I'm no
psychologist>

> What is the more fundamental thing here? Is it the contingent
> relation between the rat's behavior (in the ordinary sense of "animal
> behavior") and the delivery of a food pellet? Or, as you suggest, the
> physiology responsible* for the approximations we reinforce as well as the
> changes in the nervous system that accrue from the reinforcement which are
> then responsible for the next response. Take away the contingencies and 
> the
> rat never presses the lever. Take away its physiology (or do a lesion
> experiment) and the contingencies may not work.

MJ: Right. I agree that there is a direct link between physiology and
behavior, and the two are not easy to disentangle.

But this next salvo is a hoot:

> I'll even grant a sense in
> which physiology is more fundamental than the contingencies. One day you 
> may
> be able to directly alter nervous tissue such that an animal acquires an
> operant response class, like food-reinforced lever-pressing, without
> exposure to the contingencies of reinforcement that normally produce such 
> a
> response class.

<snip>

> I urge you to produce the phenomenon you are describing
> without arranging any exposure to contingencies of reinforcement. Let me
> know when you got that one licked, Matt.

<snip>

> GS: You can certainly spit that in my face when you can establish an 
> operant
> response class without exposure to contingencies! You will keep me 
> informed
> as to your progress. No? Certainly you see the possibilities. Why couldn't
> ready-made behavioral repertoires be extended to us? Certainly there is no
> need for graduate school, or even college. Hell! They ain't no need for 
> any
> schoolin' at all!


This is a perfect example of your narrow definition of behavior, and
your admirable resistance to letting logic get in the way of your
beliefs.

Notice that you are asking for an alteration in nervous tissue that
produces an "*operant* response class, like food-reinforced
lever-pressing", but that you also demand that no reinforcement
training is performed. How can you have food-reinforced behavior
without reinforcement? How can you produce *operant* behavior without
exposure to contingencies? Answer, YOU CAN'T because an *operant*
response class is DEFINED as a response to stimuli that is developed
based on contingencies!


That's a logical and semantic impossibility. So of course it cannot be
demonstrated. By narrowing yourself to operant conditioning as your
only definition of behavior, you end in a tautology, and then
comfortably conclude that your logic is unassailable. How convenient
for you.



GS: What I wrote goes to what is "fundamental" and "important" Even so, I'll 
grant your argument - what you should do is produce an animal that behaves 
in ways indistinguishable from one that has been exposed to contingencies. 
If you weren't more concerned with saving face than facing your arrogance 
and ignorance in all its glory you could have seen that that was the gist of 
my challenge.

MJ: Here's a thought:
Suppose we expand our definition of behavior just the tiniest bit, say,
to the task of a monkey pointing to one of two targets when cued
appropriately with a red or green light (i.e., we are asking the monkey
to tell us which color it "thinks" it was shown).  Now, this behavior
is to be initially acquired through the standard operant reinforcement
methods, ok?

Then we could ask the following question:

Given that the monkey already has the operant response class of
"food-reinforced cue-reporting" (pointing to the left target when shown
a green light, and to the right target when shown a red light), can we
alter *which* target the monkey points to by directly stimulating its
brain, and NOT by retraining it? To make sure that no new conditioning
is taking place, we should probably insist that the experiment be
performed during a single block of trials that is much briefer than the
usual number of trials necessary to build up the contigencies in the
first place.

I assert that changing its response in this way would constitute a
change in its "behavior". You may disagree because you seem to define
each specific behavior as something that must be acquired through
specific conditioning of *that* behavior. But I say that since the
monkey is still making the movement voluntarily (i.e., we're not moving
its arm, it is), and is still responding to the cue, etc, if we can
change *which* target it points to by directly stimulating a small
group of neurons, then we will have demonstrated that those neurons are
essentially directing the outcome of this complex behavior, and that at
least some part of the monkey's behavior directly results from the
activity of those neurons. To use loose language, I might even say that
we have "changed the monkey's mind" by activating neurons that are
involved in its "making up its mind" about which cue it thinks it saw,
or which answer it wants to give.

We would not be producing a new operant response class, but we would be
altering the specific response of an existing class WITHOUT tearing
down or building up any new contigencies. If this experiment could be
performed, would you allow the interpretation that it was those neurons
that were *fundamentally* important in this very specific, and very
complex, behavior (i.e., reporting to us which cue the monkey "thinks"
it was shown)?

Or is this still too far outside of your definition to be called a
change in behavior?



GS: When did I argue that physiology didn't mediate behavior? Or that one 
couldn't alter behavior by physiological intervention?



MJ: Matt


PS:

Oh yeah, I forgot about this stuf from your other post:

>GS: This is not the issue. The issue is does a cardiac cell beat? Does a
>kidney cell filter? Cardiologists and nephrologists would probably not say
>this and would think it silly. I guess that provides an answer to the last
>question above.
>
>I like this because it captures, in a nutshell, what is absurd - earlier I
> said "silly" - about your, ummm, "philosophical" position.


MJ: Are you actually on speaking terms with any cardiologists or
nephrologists? Maybe you should ask them what they think is silly or
absurd before you preach from your armchair (or slouched angrily over
your desk, or whatever).

Please visit these sites to see movies of a single cardiac cell
beating:



GS: The first step in a scientific analysis is to describe the phenomenon in 
question. In the case of a "beating heart" noting that a sound is produced 
(hence the appellation) would be a primitive start. The beating of the heart 
is produced when the whole heart contracts etc. The issue is not whether 
there are "pacemaker cells," the issue is whether or not a single can be 
said (in something other than a nonsensical way) to do what the entire 
heart, with its specialized parts, is said to do.

http://www.bioclips.com/dvd/movies/mitochondria10.html
http://www.bio.brandeis.edu/publications/beating_myocytex.mov

MJ: And yes, single kidney cells do filter all by their little selves.
Please read this paper (uh, keep dictionary handy) to learn about
filtration by single kidney cells:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=8636089&dopt=Abstract

This must be my lucky day. Your rhetorical questions prove my point in
such an elegant way.



GS: I suggest you think more on that. You won't, but that is my advice, 
nonetheless.



Cordially,

Glen



"jonesmat" <jonesmat At physiology.wisc.edu> wrote in message 
news:1165018369.855804.155530 At 80g2000cwy.googlegroups.com...




More information about the Neur-sci mailing list

Send comments to us at biosci-help [At] net.bio.net