In article <2fvate$pvh at panix.com>, jmax at panix.com (John Hobbs) wrote:
> That is exactly the point I am trying to make. If identical DNA and
> identical initial conditions cannot make a duplicate, how can we expect to
> be able to create a computing/storage device to identically duplicate the
> brain of the uploader? Uploading my be feasable, but the resulting
> individual would not continue the identity of the uploader, due to chaos
> and indeterminancy, a different, machine-based identity would have to ensue.
On the other hand, you are probably not exactly the same individual that
you were yesterday, and certainly not the same as you were 10 years ago. So
perfect constancy of identity is not required for continuity of identity.
If the divergence of your hypothetical machine-based copy were no greater
than the divergence over time of biological identities, then it might not
make much difference.
