IUBio

It's primitive; it's dumb (PLAUSIBLE definitions?)

Wolfgang Schwarz wschwarz at zedat.fu-berlin.de
Fri Jul 9 04:49:57 EST 1999


Moin,

"F. Frank LeFever" wrote:
> 
> Definitions are neither plausible nor implausible.

sure, sorry.
I meant: It seems plausible to me that what we usually mean when we
speak of intelligence is some functional property.

> The famous argument which you say Searle has "on his side" is simply
> another example of a profound intellectual dishonesty.  Yes, it would
> be "odd" to say that the fellow in that room "understood" the questions
> or answers, but it is dishonest to neglect to say that this is a
> metaphore for a primitive concept of brain function: somewhere in
> there, there is a little man who "uses" all the information being piped
> in to him, i.e., who does the "thinking", who is "conscious".
> Obviously, the ROOM (with the little man's help) understands Chinese
> very well.

I wouldn't call this obvious. Our ordinary concept of "understanding
Chinese" is far from being applicable to rooms. And I would find it
very odd indeed to say that the room understood the problems which I
gave it as input.

> Searle, of course, will simply say "if it's not a little man, it can't
> be conscious, and it can't really understand, no matter HOW much it
> seems to".  

I don't think so. As far as I know, Searle doesn't propose any model
of brain functions. All he wants to say is that syntactic manipulation
of symbols is not sufficient for "real" understanding. He then goes on
to say that only natural brains are capable of this other kind of
information processing, which is necessary for "real" understanding. I
don't see an argument for that though. However, he doesn't speak of
homunculi inside our brains - at least not in the texts I read so far.

The whole issue seems to depend on what is meant with "understanding".
In a functional sense the Chinese room does understand. In the sense
in which the term is commonly used, it doesn't, because understanding
a question in this sense requires concious thinking about it, i.e.
grasp of its semantical content.

regards,

Wolfgang.

-- 
homepage: http://www.wald.org/wolfgang
"Wo kaemen wir hin, wenn jeder sagte: 'wo kaemen wir hin?' und keiner
ginge, um zu sehen, wohin wir kaemen, wenn wir gingen?"




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