Glen M. Sizemore wrote in message ...
>Sergio Navega:
>>"...how to explain operant conditioning..."
>>Bravo, sir, bravo!
>Glen
>
Sergio: I'm doubtful about your intention here, if it is
just an ironic comment or a sincere agreement with
the difficulty of the task. If it is just an irony,
I may even understand it, but only if you're confusing
'operant conditioning' as being an explanation,
instead of being what it is, just an evidence with
a fancy name.
Glen: It is my turn to be confused. Actually, my
comment was not meant as "ironic"(I'm not sure
what that would mean here - I think the English
word you are looking for is "facetious") or as
"...sincere agreement with the difficulty of the
task..." (if the "task" is a neurobiological
understanding of operant conditioning, even though
you have my agreement here). My comment was
meant as praise for what appeared to be your
recognition of the overwhelming importance of the
process (of operant conditioning) in understanding
complex human behavior, but I see the praise was
probably premature.
It is true that the term "operant conditioning" is
simply a name given to a set of observations, but
there is a sense in which it is an explanatory
mechanism. This is the same sense in which "natural
selection" is an explanatory mechanism even if no
reference is made to the "underlying mechanism."
See? Or is it necessary for me to educate you?
Sergio: Behaviorists frequently confuse both,
thinking that there's nothing more to do after naming
evidences and devising laws.
Glen: At least you recognize the lawful nature of the
experimental analysis of behavior (EAB), but most
behaviorists that I know do not claim that operant
conditioning cannot be understood in a
neurobiological sense. Nor do they question the
importance of this endeavor. They do, however,
usually claim that behavior qua behavior can be
understood at its own level. You seem to recognize
as much when you talk about "devising laws."
Perhaps it is you who are confused?
Sergio: But science only grows if its
laws go beyond mere predictive power (after all, we
can predict very well what happens because of
gravity; however we don't have a damn clue about
how to explain it).
Glen: Your argument is internally inconsistent. The
EAB does, in fact, generate laws, and laws do more
than predict - they allow one to control one's subject
matter.
Sergio: It's necessary to develop explanations which
are reasonably intertwined and coherent with other
theories, from other fields.
Glen: This is naive at best. No one would try to
reconcile, for example, special relativity with notions
of a mechanical ether. Some theories are simply best
abandoned. Some are not.
Sergio: But I guess you should've noticed that what
I really proposed was a bit different:
"...how to explain operant conditioning *and*
systematicity/generativity simultaneously..."
Glen: I have followed some of your posts and I find
them occasionally ambiguous, as I find the statement
above ambiguous. I am sorry that I have not
"studied you" but I am waiting for a reason to do so.
The EAB is quite interested in a systematization of
behavioral phenomena - it has been, historically,
interested in an empirical systematization of
behavior, and many have recently become interested
in more mathematically oriented systematizations. I
do not know what you mean by "generativity,"
though.......perhaps "generality?" Again, my
apologies if I have not studied all of your posts but
you have given me little reason to do so, and your
arrogance, and inclination to slander those you
clearly do not understand in any scholarly way,
seems to support this perception.
Sergio: This is the kind of question that seems
interesting to investigate on a wider approach than
the purely behavioristic methodology.
Glen: Behaviorism is not a methodology but, rather,
a philosophy that holds that behavior qua behavior is
the proper subject matter of psychology. It seeks to
explain complex behavior, at the level of behavior, in
terms of the facts uncovered by an experimental
analysis, which emphasizes direct demonstrations of
experimental control of the behavior of individual
subjects. It is, thus, true that behaviorism is
associated with a particular kind of methodology,
but it is so much more, as is evident in such works
as Science and Human Behavior (Skinner, 1957) and
Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957).
Most cordially and respectfully,
Glen
"Sergio Navega" <snavega at attglobal.net> wrote in message
news:39a663e9_3 at news3.prserv.net...
> Glen M. Sizemore wrote in message ...
> >Sergio Navega:
> >>"...how to explain operant conditioning..."
> >
> >Bravo, sir, bravo!
> >Glen
> >
>> I'm doubtful about your intention here, if it is
> just an ironic comment or a sincere agreement with
> the difficulty of the task. If it is just an irony,
> I may even understand it, but only if you're confusing
> 'operant conditioning' as being an explanation,
> instead of being what it is, just an evidence with
> a fancy name.
>> Behaviorists frequently confuse both, thinking that
> there's nothing more to do after naming evidences
> and devising laws. But science only grows if its
> laws go beyond mere predictive power (after all, we
> can predict very well what happens because of gravity;
> however we don't have a damn clue about how to explain
> it). It's necessary to develop explanations which are
> reasonably intertwined and coherent with other theories,
> from other fields.
>> But I guess you should've noticed that what I really
> proposed was a bit different:
>> "...how to explain operant conditioning *and*
> systematicity/generativity simultaneously..."
>> This is the kind of question that seems interesting
> to investigate on a wider approach than the purely
> behavioristic methodology.
>> Regards,
> Sergio Navega.
>>>
