IUBio

death of the mind.

Eray Ozkural exa erayo at bilkent.edu.tr
Fri Jul 23 21:57:17 EST 2004


feedbackdroids at yahoo.com (dan michaels) wrote in message news:<8d8494cf.0407220958.2d08e14 at posting.google.com>...
> erayo at bilkent.edu.tr (Eray Ozkural  exa) wrote in message news:<fa69ae35.0407220601.2cc94db3 at posting.google.com>...
> > Let's please avoid equating metaphysical materialism with behaviorism.
> > 
> > My digital multism, for instance, is metaphysical materialism, but it
> > is by no means behaviorism. Machine functionalism is materialist as
> > well, but it is not behaviorism.
> > 
> > Regards,
> 
> 
> You'll have to take the terminology issue up with Adler. As I see it,
> not all materialism is beh, nor dogmatic. My materialism is neither,
> of course. Does your DM dogmatically assert the truth of the
> nonexistence of things unprovable? I doubt it. According to Adler,
> making working assumptions are not the error, but asserting dogmatism
> as truth is error.

Agreed. By "metaphysical materialism" he might mean something else.

DM does not dogmatically assert that things unprovable do not exist.
We can discuss it; it's an interesting thought. If something is not
provable, does it exist?

If a (sufficiently powerful) formal system is consistent, is its
consistency provable (in the same system)? Godel's theorem says
interesting things about that. Oh, I think I'm getting a headache! [A
Godel "expert" could pop up at any instant!] The answer is no. It has
to be proved somewhere else.

According to Godel, the second incompleteness theorem holds for finite
systems as well. Our universe seems to be finite.

But "consistency" is a condition, it is not material "existence"
itself, so such conditions could exist in a non-material sense. I
think there is nothing strange about a proposition about a computable
universe being true, which itself is not computable... [As much as I
sound like Lester when I talk about the non-material]

I'm aware that the above reasoning does not seem coherent, however, it
would be made all the more plausible if we understand that finite
beings can answer only a tiny part of the unknowable metaphysical
propositions such as those about the  "consistency of the universe"
(which is not too sensible anyway! what would an inconsistent universe
be like!!!???).

Regards,

--
Eray Ozkural

PS: Thus, I do think material existence has something to do with
computability, but I prefer to avoid equating existence in general
with all imaginable propositions (at the present).  For the record, I
do not imply that minds are non-material, either. Quite the opposite.
I tend to think they can be identified as locality of energy, or
something just as physical.



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