On Sat, 24 Jul 2004 08:57:58 +0100, David Longley
<David at longley.demon.co.uk> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>In article <fa69ae35.0407231857.334fa4b2 at posting.google.com>, Eray
>Ozkural exa <erayo at bilkent.edu.tr> writes
>>feedbackdroids at yahoo.com (dan michaels) wrote in message
>>news:<8d8494cf.0407220958.2d08e14 at posting.google.com>...
>>>erayo at bilkent.edu.tr (Eray Ozkural exa) wrote in message
>>>news:<fa69ae35.0407220601.2cc94db3 at posting.google.com>...
>>> > Let's please avoid equating metaphysical materialism with behaviorism.
>>> >
>>> > My digital multism, for instance, is metaphysical materialism, but it
>>> > is by no means behaviorism. Machine functionalism is materialist as
>>> > well, but it is not behaviorism.
>>> >
>>> > Regards,
>>>>>>>>> You'll have to take the terminology issue up with Adler. As I see it,
>>> not all materialism is beh, nor dogmatic. My materialism is neither,
>>> of course. Does your DM dogmatically assert the truth of the
>>> nonexistence of things unprovable? I doubt it. According to Adler,
>>> making working assumptions are not the error, but asserting dogmatism
>>> as truth is error.
>>>>Agreed. By "metaphysical materialism" he might mean something else.
>>>>DM does not dogmatically assert that things unprovable do not exist.
>>We can discuss it; it's an interesting thought. If something is not
>>provable, does it exist?
>>>Materialism is not the issue, the issue is extensionalism.
The issue is materialism. Without it extensionalism is nothing.
>If you don't accept that 'to be' (exist) is to be the value of a
>variable (Quine), what use can be made of (talking about or referring
>to) an entity?
And where does this mysterious variable of which one is the value come
from, pray tell?
> What point is there to having entities within a
>scientific ontology which have no identity?
Positivist mysticism again?
> Surely the whole point of
>science is to discover useful functional relations between such values?
Hardly the whole point.
[. . .]
Regards - Lester