In <anderson.757271129 at xray1.cshl.org> anderson at cshl.org (John Anderson) writes:
>jmax at panix.com (John Hobbs) wrote:
>> 3. If it is possible to create a neural analogue, how can we expect
>> identity to
>> remain intact when twins who are structurally identical do not have
>> personalities and identities?
>Identical twins are *genetically* identical, but the stochastic nature
>of developmental processes virtually ensures that the details of their
>structures will be different. See Figure 3-5 in GM Edelman's BRIGHT
>AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE for an illustration of this in the case of the
>nervous systems of genetically-identical water fleas; presumably the
>same kind of variation occurs in human twins. And since identical
>twins have different life experiences, even if the nervous systems
>were structurally identical, i.e. had the same three-dimensional
>structure, learning and memory processes would probably have
>established different patterns of synaptic weights. I think these
>differences in detail could at least partially account for differences
>in personality and other behaviors.
That is exactly the point I am trying to make. If identical DNA and
identical initial conditions cannot make a duplicate, how can we expect to
be able to create a computing/storage device to identically duplicate the
brain of the uploader? Uploading my be feasable, but the resulting
individual would not continue the identity of the uploader, due to chaos
and indeterminancy, a different, machine-based identity would have to ensue.