First Causes

Lester Zick lesterDELzick at worldnet.att.net
Tue Sep 7 15:19:52 EST 2004

On Tue, 7 Sep 2004 14:09:32 +0200, "JPL Verhey"
<matterDELminds at hotmail.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick at worldnet.att.net> wrote in message 
>news:413c719f.22600721 at netnews.att.net...
>> The only cause which supplies its own proof as first cause is the idea
>> of differences and cognates of differences: negation, contradiction,
>> not, etc. and that principle compounded in terms of itself. Neither
>> Aristotle's prime mover unmoved nor god is proven of itself. Nor are
>> evolution and the natural selection of species proven with respect to
>> the categories and transitions between the categories.
>> The only thing proven of itself as the source and first cause of
>> everything are differences and cognates of differences. And it is
>> in terms of these elements that the categories of being are to be
>> examined and explained in strict mechanical terms of one another.
>If I try to understand this:
>[{A} . . . . . . . . .  {B}]
>       \               /
>        \            /
>     [Difference]

Here I would use the term differences as opposed to difference.

>You say D is what causes [{A}...{B}] to exist?

I'd say D is what causes A . . . B. Period. Not what causes  A . . . B
to exist because the existence of A . . . B is determined according to
the nature and properties of the differences involved in A . . . B.

>What about the nature of A, B and D?

The nature of A and B are governed by differences between and among A
and B and other things defined in terms of differences. The nature of
D, by which I understand you to mean differences and differences
between differences, is determined by the mechanics of differences in
relation to one another.

>If {A} and {B} are to be mechanised in terms of one another, then isn't 
>[Difference] just another word for known mechanical terms that describe A-B 
>relationships? In other words, aren't [Difference] and known A-B mechanics 
>(in physics for instance) the *same*?

No. Not at all, though this is a good question that gets to the heart
of the matter. We can analyze the mechanics of differences in relation
to one another without defining anything more than the mechanics of
the categories resulting from those differences. In other words, we
don't define the properties of A and B through the analysis of
differences; we only define the categorical possibilities of A and B.

A and B are really just particular or specific historical artifacts of
those categorical possibilities. The properties of A and B are not
determined in particular through the analysis of D but only in

>[{A} . . . . . . . . .  {B}]
>       \               /
>        \            /
>[known 101 spatio-temporal mechanics]
>I would not yet dare to place any "first cause" anywhere in the two above 
>models; chicken/egg, indivisibility, etc. It appears that from any 
>epistemological model we can cut and paste any item anywhere in trying to 
>construct an ontology we hope to be correct - but the result appears more 
>like "mechanising knowledge", i.e. a simulation we never are sure of what 
>exactly is simulated.

Well, JPL, there is nothing in the general idea of the mechanization
of differences in relation to one another denying proven mechanics.
However, there is a great deal in the mechanization of differences
denying unproven speculative spatio-temporal nonsense like hyper
dimensionality and certain aspects of special relativity. The problem
is that it's pretty difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff and
the proven from the unproven without some idea of the mechanics on
which they're based.

Regards - Lester

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