First Causes

Lester Zick lesterDELzick at worldnet.att.net
Tue Sep 14 10:10:36 EST 2004

On 14 Sep 2004 01:21:02 -0700, dralexgreen at yahoo.co.uk (Alex Green) in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>lesterDELzick at worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote in message news:<4145c332.21563699 at netnews.att.net>...

[. . .]

>> I'm not sure what the above means, but let me try to state clearly
>> what I intend.
>> I maintain that everything from blue cars to vivid thoughts can be and
>> is derived mechanically from differences and differences between
>> differences. And what I prove through exclusion of self contradictory
>> alternatives is there can be no non self contradictory alternative to
>> differences in the form of not, contradiction, or negation. Therefore
>> any positive thing is the indirect result of differences between
>> differences and thus cannot be primary despite being positive.
>> As far as plain english examples are concerned, let me offer the
>> following observation. No positive specifics like blue cars or vivid
>> thoughts or atoms can be primary because they are particular and not
>> universal. They are not universal because none of them can be proven
>> applicable to everything of logical necessity. The only thing that can
>> be proven universal in the sense of being necessarily applicable to
>> everything of logical necessity is contradiction because contradiction
>> of contradiction is self contradiction.
>> If I have some positive specific like blue cars, how could it be
>> proven universally applicable to everything. It couldn't. We could use
>> exemplary denial and produce non blue cars to show that blue cars
>> aren't universal. But there is no way to demonstrate that blue cars
>> can be, much less have to be, universal. The only way to prove that
>> something, anything, can be and has to be universal is by showing that
>> alternatives are inherently self contradictory. And the only way to do
>> that is if the primary principle is differences in the form of not,
>> negation, or contradiction to begin with because no other basic
>> principle produces self contradictory alternatives.
>Above you write that P "not" "would not be applied to "cars are blue"
>to produce "cars are not blue"." This means that it is neither a
>negation nor an operation that produces a negation.

Not true. P "not" is general negation. It is not intended to apply to
particular negations such as P "cars are blue" to produce P "cars
are not blue". Both P "cars are blue" and P "cars are not blue" are
derived from P "not" but not because P "not" is pasted between
particular predicates.

>                                                                                       I can see that
>there is a possibility of a qualitative 'difference' such as
>post-structuralists use but this just allows students to sound
>intellectual when writing essays on literature courses.

I have no idea who post structuralists are or who their students may
be. I don't doubt there are many people who are interested in sounding
intellectual. The world of philosophy and the ranks of academia are
filled with them. I'm only interested in universally demonstrable
first causes and their consequences.

>Earlier you said that P "not" symbolised differences and above you
>write: "everything from blue cars to vivid thoughts can be and is
>derived mechanically from differences and differences between
>differences".  Please can you detail the operation that would be
>performed mechanically to implement P "not". As an example, AND can be
>performed electromechanically by a set of switches arranged serially
>along a single wire. Please explain the mechanical implementation of P
>"not" so it can be understood.

In computationalist terms the best I can suggest and have suggested in
the past is the exclusive-or or XOR instruction.

However please don't come back and complain that the XOR instruction
requires predefined operands for its implementation and this means
that identity preceeds differences. This is true only in the limited
computationalist sense. There is no universal demonstration possible
for this contention in the real world at large. I have discussed the
shortcomings of computationalism on several counts in connection with
ai with Eray and others over the last several months. It's useful for
modeling ai but not for the direct implementation of intelligence
(Apocalypse Now - 2/8/4).

Regards - Lester

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